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The Quinlan Case 
John R. Connery, S.J. 
Father Connery is currently on 
the staff of the Kennedy Institute 
of Bioethics at Georgetown Uni-
versity. He also serves on the 
Editorial Advisory Board of Lin-
acre. This article is reprinted with 
permission from Hospital Prog-
ress, December, 1975. Copyright 
1975 by the Catholic Hospital 
Association. 
Directive n. 28 of the Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Ca th-
olic Health Facilities reads in 
part as follows: "The failure to 
supply ordinary means of preserv-
ing life is equivalent to euthana-
sia. However, neither the physi-
cian nor the patient is obliged to 
the use of extraordinary means." 
Anyone reading this directive 
may be puzzled at what seemed 
to be the reaction of both doctors 
and administration at St. Clare's 
Hospital, Denville, New Jersey, 
to the request of the parents of 
Karen Ann Quinlan to remove the 
respirator from their daughter and 
let God's will be done. The par-
ents had come to this decision 
after prayer and consultation with 
their local pastor. Being assured 
that the decision was entirely 
consistent with the teaching of 
their Church, the father made the 
request. Unfortunately, it met 
with refusal. 
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The girl was originally admit-
ted into another hospital on April 
15, 1975, in a comatose state, but 
was soon (April 24) transferred to 
St. Clare's. She had suffered mas-
sive and irreparable brain damage, 
and has remained in a comatose 
state since that time. She has 
been on a respirator and has been 
fed through a tube, and the doc-
tors hold out little or no hope that 
she can be taken off the respirator 
in the foreseeable future . 
The case would seem to be a 
classic example of ext.raordinary 
means. Such artificiallife-sustain-
ers as respirators, etc., would not 
be classified as extraordinary 
means to relieve acute conditions 
of short duration, but moral 
theologians have commonly held 
that long-term use of these sus-
tainers would convert them into 
extraordinary means. If the use 
of such means has to become a 
way of life for a patient, it be-
comes a real burden. This would 
be true even if the patient was 
conscious and the use of the sus-
tainer offered real benefit. Hemo-
dialysis, for instance, will let a 
person suffering from chronic kid-
ney shutdown lead a fairly nor-
mal life if he continues it. But if 
it has to become a way of life for 
such a patient, theologians would 
see it as an excessively heavy bur-
den to bear. If indeed a patient 
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wants to continue life even in 
these circumstances he has the 
option of doing so. But to oblige 
a patient to do so would in the 
words of Pius XII "be too bur-
densome for most men and would 
render the attainment of the high-
er, more important good too dif-
ficult." In the case of the Quinlan 
girl the burden is at least as great, 
and with little or no perceptible 
benefit. 
How can one account for the 
negative reaction of the doctors 
and the hospital to the request of 
Mr. Quinlan? One must assume 
that they were acquainted with 
and had at least a minimal under-
standing of directive n. 28 quoted 
above. Did they consider the use 
of the respirator and other life 
sustainers in this case ordinary 
means? This is a possibility. They 
might even have judged turning 
off the respirator a lethal act, or 
at least a violation of the doctor's 
first norm: non nocere. 
Obviously, there is a clear dif-
ference between turning off a 
respirator and injecting an air 
bubble into a patient's veins. The 
latter is a real cause of death. The 
respirator does no more than pre-
vent natural causes of death from 
taking their effect. When it is 
turned off, death will result from 
the same causes that would have 
brought it about initially if the 
respirator had not been used. 
Turning off the respirator is in 
no sense a positive cause of death. 
It would be wrong, of course, not 
to turn on a respirator, or to turn 
it off, in a case where it would be 
judged an ordinary means. But 
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as an extraordinary means there 
is no obligation to initiate it or 
continue it. 
Some doctors will scruple more 
about discontinuing extraordi-
nary means than about not in-
itiating them. The underlying rea-
son for this is perhaps a greater 
moral sensitivity to acts of com-
mission than to omission. This 
sensitivity may be justified in 
other contexts, but in the present 
case it is not. There may be a psy-
chological problem here, but clear-
ly there is no moral problem. If 
there is no obligation to initiate 
extraordinary means, there is no 
obligation to continue them. One 
does not assume an obligation to 
continue such means merely by 
beginning to use them. It is quite 
true that in the Quinlan case 
there may have been an initial 
obligation to use a respirator due 
to the uncertainty of the prog-
nosis. But if the doctors had 
known at that time what they 
know now, there would have been 
no clear obligatio~ even then. 
Some doctors may feel that it 
is their duty to their profession 
to use all available means, as long 
as the patient is alive. This is in 
many respects a commendable at-
titude. If this is what the patient 
or relatives wish, the selflessness 
of the doctor will be most appre-
ciated. But even here I suspect 
that the doctor himself would 
recognize a limit. He has other 
patients to take care of; he cannot 
be totally available to anyone 
patient. But there are other limi-
tations as well. Professional con-
scientiousness does not entitle the 
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doctor to override the legitimate 
wishes of his patient. Here the 
judicious words of Pius XII to 
the International Congress of 
Anaesthesiologists are pertinent: 
"The doctor ... has no separate 
or independent right where the 
patient is concerned. In general 
he can take action only if the pa-
tient explicitly or implicitly, di-
rectly or indirectly, gives his per-
mission." The duty of the doctor 
to his profession does not entitle 
him to go counter to the wishes 
of his patient, unless, of course, 
the patient wishes him to do 
something morally wrong. The 
profession exists for the patient; 
not the patient for the profession. 
Since the patient has no obliga-
tion to use extraordinary means, 
he is within his rights to refuse 
them. And if he does, the doctor 
has no right to impose them on 
him. 
VVould the request have been 
granted if it came from the pa-
tient herself? Certainly, it is the 
patient who has the basic right 
to make the decision about using 
extraordinary means. But it is 
generally agreed that if the pa-
tient cannot make the decision, it 
is the responsibility of her closest 
relatives. They are presumably in 
the best position to know what 
the patient would want, and their 
decision should ordinarily be in 
accord with these wishes. If the 
wishes of the patient are not clear 
to the responsible relative, he 
should make the best decision he 
can in the circumstances. This 
might very legitimately be the 
decision he would make if he were 
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in a similar situation. In the Quin-
lan case from statements which 
the girl herself had made pre-
viously the parents had good rea-
son to believe that she would not 
have wanted extraordinary treat-
ment. And since she was not 
obliged to use such means, the 
parents were within their rightH 
in requesting their termination. 
So there should have been no 
hesitancy about the request be-
cause it did not come from the 
patient herself. 
There seems to be no justifica-
tion or moral grounds for the 
refusal of the doctors or the hos-
pital to heed the request of the 
Quinlan family. There may, how-
ever, be a legal problem. Every-
body in the medical profession 
is aware today of the plague of 
malpractice suits afflicting it. The 
doctors and the hospital in this 
case may have been worried about 
their liability to such a suit if they 
had cooperated with the wishes of 
the parents in the QuiI1lan case. 
Even more serious would be li-
ability to a criminal charge. This 
is a present concern even in cases 
where "brain death" has occurred, 
but so-called "vital signs" are still 
present due to the use of artificial 
life sustainers. It would obviously 
be more of a threat in such as the 
Quinlan case where "brain death" 
has certainly not occurred. 
For several centuries moral 
theologians have clearly distin-
guished between taking a life and 
not using extraordinary means to 
prolong it. Some of these theo-
logians were jurists as well as 
theologians, and so, knowledge-
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able in the law. Domengo So to, 
O.P. for instance, in his De lure 
at lustitia discusses the obliga-
tion to undergo an amputation 
(without anesthesia) and says: 
"No one is bound to prolong life 
with such pain; nor is he to be 
considered a homicide for this 
reason." Theologians after Soto 
have spelled out this obligation 
more in detail and formalized it in 
the distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means. They 
may differ among themselves on 
minor details, but on one point 
they are unanimous. There is a 
sharp distinction between homi-
cide and failing to use extraordi-
nary means. The u n d e r I yin g 
reason is that there is a limit to 
the obligation to prolong life. A 
strong defense could be made 
then against any charge of violat-
ing a homicide statute. 
The danger of a malpractice 
suit can hardly be discounted 
when they are occurring with 
such frequency. Even though 
there is undoubtedly far less mal-
practice today than at any time 
in the past (the practice of medi-
cine was largely malpractice until 
relatively recent times), there is 
an unbelievable number of mal-
practice suits. This tells us more 
about our times than it does 
about the practice of medicine. 
Interestingly enough, the threat 
of the law can be at least as great 
if the doctor tries to impose the 
use of extraordinary means on a 
patient. The present writer knows 
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of a case where the wife of a pa-
tient threatened the doctor with 
a charge of assault and battery 
if he forced extraordinary means 
on her husband. 
This much should be said. If a 
doctor or hospital judge that they 
are doing the right thing, they 
should not be deterred by the 
fear of a malpractice suit. Fear 
of such a suit may be healthy up 
to a point-to the point that it 
pre v e n t s malpractice. But it 
should not become morbid; it 
should not prevent legitimate 
medical practice. If the fear of 
malpractice suits becomes a real 
phobia, the practice of medicine 
will suffocate. 
What is most regrettable in the 
present case is that the parents 
had to have recourse to the law 
to exercise their rights and those 
of their daughter. One would have 
hoped that the doctors and the 
hospital would have been more 
courageous, and obviated the ne-
cessity of bringing the case into 
court. The court has now ruled 
against the parents. The decision 
will undoubtedly be appealed, as 
it probably would have been if it 
was in their favor. The real trage-
dy of the case is that neither the 
family nor the girl herself will get 
any relief. Karen will without 
doubt die on the respirator. The 
only consolation the parents can 
have is that through their efforts 
patients and their relatives in the 
future may be spared this ordeal. 
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